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CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: CRITEItIA AND INDICESt)
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been worldwide interest in examining the scope for greater monetary policy
autonomy for the central bank. At the EC-summit in Maastricht in December a Treaty on
European Economic and Monetazy Union (EMU) was agraed upon. According to this treaty, in
the final stage of EMU - i.e. by 1997 or later - the European Central Bank is supposed to assume
unlimited responsibility for monetazy policy. Broadly speaking, according to Alesina and Grilli
(1991), the accepied Statute2) guazantees a central bank as independent from national and
European political institutions as the Bundesbank. Furthermore, in the Pacific Basin Countries the
same tendency can be discerned. Since the end of 1989 governor Mieno strengenthed the position
of the Bank of Japan with respect to the Ministry of Finance, while New-Zealand enacted
legislation in February 1990 that increased the independence of its Reserve Bank. Finally, in
Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia and Poland have been considering proposals concerning central
bank independence.3)
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence finds its origin in the ongoing 'Rules
versus Discretion' debate. As Rogoff (1985) notes, dynamic inconsistency theories of inflation of
the Barro-Gordon (1983) type, make it plausible that countries with independent central banks
have a lower sustainable rate of inflation.
Unlike the well~eveloped theoretical literature,41 there aze only a few studies that compare
actual monetazy regimes between a lazge number of countries.s) The most comprehensive studies
are Fair (1980), Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989), Alesina and Summers (1990) and
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Focusing on more recent studies, it is striking that the
conclusions of the latter are less clear-cut than the theoretical literature. For instance, contrary to
Alesina and Summers, Bade and Pazkin find no correlation between central bank independence
and the variability of inflation. Next, unlike the prediction of the Barro-Gordon framework, 6~
both Alesina and Summers and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini find no association between
central bank independence and (the variability of) real output growth.
A recent study by the International Monetazy Fund (Swinburne and Castello-Branco (1991)),
questions the reliability of these empirical conclusions. This is because neazly all of them are







We are grateful for cooperation by Alberto Alesina and Micbael Parkin. Of course the usual disclaimer
applies. Mrs Marja Speekenbrink and Miss Jolanda Bakhuis typed the maauscript. Eric Schaling wishea
to thank the Netherlands Organimtion for Scieatific Reaearch (NWO) for financial support.
See Committce ofGovernora, (1991).
For an interesting survey of central baaking in emerging m4rlcet-otiented economie8 see Federa)
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(output, inflation).~ Therefore, these results - e.g. the well-imown inverse relationship between
independence and the level of inflation found by Alesina (1988, 1989) - aze particularly sensitive
to the numerical values of indices. These values are dependent on (i) criteria used in the
examination of central bank laws (statutes), (ii) the interpretation of the relevant statute as to
whether a central bank meets this criterion, i.e. possesses a certain amibute, and (iii) the way
these attributes are aggregated to a composite index of ceatral bank independence.
This paper compares the major indices of central bank independence as presented in Bade and
Parlun (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989) and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Such a
compazison does not yet exist in the literature. We focus on three aspects: (a) is the index based
on a correct (or best possible) interpretation of the central bank law? (b) is the index consistent in
using all relevant criteria in determining the independence of each central bank? (c) are the indices
of the vazious authors different or not?
In order to answer the questions mentioned above, the paper is organized as follows. In section 2
we describe the laws that define the competence of central banks in monetary policy making.
Twelve industrial countries are examined: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Switzerland. We
describe the central bank laws of these countries focusing on three areas: (i) formal responsibilities
(objectives) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy, (ii) relationships between central
baziks and government in the formulation of monetary policy, and (iii) procedures for appointing
the boazd of the central bank. After a critical examination of the existing indices in section 3, in
section 4 we construM our 'own' index of central bank independence. According to this index, we
qualify e.g. the Bank of Japan as less independent than Alesina (1988, 1989), while for the Neder-
landsche Bank the reverse applies.
Finally, our main conclusions can be summazized as follows. It appears that Grilli, Masciandaro
and Tabellini, and Bade and Pazkin, differ in their interpretations of the statutes of Canada,
France, Belgium, Japan, and the Netherlands. These differences concern both the presence of
government officials on the bank board, and the final authority in policy making. Moreover, by
using a very strict criterion concerning the appointment of directors, Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini severely bias the ranking of the Bundesbank and Banca d'Italia vis à vis Bade and
Pazlun. Also in examining the Alesina (1988, 1989) index of central bank independence, we found
that the Alesina composite indicator is inconsistent, and therefore does not qualify as an index of
central bank independence.
2 CENTRAL BANK LAWS
2.1 Sweden
Established in 1668, the Sveriges Riksbank is the oldest central banlc in the world. Although this
central bank is legally independent of the government, it is not in practice. The legal base for the
policy making by the Riksbank is the Sveriges Riksbank Act ('Lag fíir Sveriges Riksbank') of
~ Exceptions are Bade and Parkin (1988), pp. 21-23, and Schaling (1991).
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1934.s) The Act provides no specific objectives for the central bank, like in other countries.
In practice, monetary policy is a part of the economic policy by the government and fits into
this `...to quite the same degree as where this obligation has been given a legal basis'.9)
According to Article 1 of the Act, the Riksbank is d'trectly subordinated to the Riksdag (parlia-
ment) and formally independent. Furthermore, Article 32 státes the following: `The Directors may
not receive instructions with regard to the administration of the Riksbank from anyone ezcept the
Riksdag and its Banking Committee in cases in which that Committee is competent to give
instructions on behalf of the Riksdag...'.lo)
In addition to this Act, the Riksdag approved special regulations, such as the Credit Policy
Instruments Act of 1974, in which `...a government authorization is required before the Riksbank
may ezercise its powers'.11)
Thus, the policy making by the Riksbank is influenced considerably by the government through
these special regulations, in particular by the Ministry of Finance and Economics.l2)
The Board of Directors (`Bankofullmáktige') of the Riksbank has eight members, of which seven
aze appointed by the Riksdag for a period of three years.13)
These Directors appoint a Governor, who plays only a representative role, for a period of five
years and elect among themselves a Chairman on recommendation of the government. The Boazd
takes decisions by a majority with a decisive vote of the Chairman. I-Iowever, until 1976 and in
1982 Social-Democratic governments used to appoint the Chairman, mostly a former (Deputy)
Minister of Finance or Economics.
The financing of the budget deficit of the government is considered as a pazt of monetary policy
and has no formal restrictions. In this respect, the Riksbank co-0perates with the National Debt
Office, which is also subordinated to the Riksdag and its Banking Committee.14)
2.2 United Kingdom
The Bank of England, established in 1694, was nationalized by the Bank of England Act of
1946.15) This Act provides only information on the appointment of the Court of Directors and
the right to give instructions to the Bank of England. According to Article 4(1): `The Treasury
may from time to time give such directions to the Bank as, after consultation with the Governor of
the Bank, they think necessary in the public interest'.
At the introduction of the Act it was stressed that this right to give directions was not meant to
lead to `...any day-to-day interference by the Government or the Treasury with the ordinary work










See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 663-671. The last revisioa of this Act was made in 1988.
From: Skanland ( 1984), p. 16.
Aufricht (1967), pp. 668~i69.
In: Sveriges Rikshaalc, Credit and Foreign Exchange, 1990.
See: Fair (1979), P. 40.
See: Sveriges Riksbaok, Annual Report 1990, p. S.
According to Article 41 (1) of the Riksdag Statutes. See: Aufricht (1967), p. 671.
See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 185-192.
From: Eiz~ga ( 1991), p. 4. Eizenga ( 1991) distinguishes three differences between the right to give
instructions in the United Kingdom end that prevailing in the Netherlands.
Page 4
never occured until now.
It was the Banking Act of 1979 (revised in 198T) that formulated the responsibilities of the central
bank. The main task of the Bank of England is the (prudential) supervision of the banking system.
`Other activities of the Bank governed by statute include its note-issuing powers, its management
of the Exchange Equalisation Account on behalf of the Treasury, and its duties as banker to the
Government and as Government's agent in managing the National Debt'.1~ Nevertheless,
monetary policy is regarded as a component of economic policy and therefore conducted by the
government with the central bank as its major adviser. As stated in a memorandum by the Bank:
`Economic policy is the responsibility of the Government and is detenntined by Ministers. Policy
decisions aze, however, the end product of the assimilation and discussion of studies, forecasts,
advice and proposals available to Ministers from a wide range of sources, in which processes the
Bank of England has a role to play which can be disinguished from that of Government depart-
ments'.ts) The Bank's advice is made available to Ministers both in day-to-day contacts between
Bank and Treasury officials and by regular contacts between the Governor and the Chancellor of
the Ezchequer (Minister of Finance).
The Bank of England is managed by the Court of Directors, which is made up of the Governor,
the Deputy Governor and sizteen Directors.19) All members aze appointed by the Crown on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister. The term of office for the Governor and the Deputy
Governor is fuced at five yeazs and for the Directors at four years. Four of these Directors aze
full-time Ezecutive Directors, the other twelve being part-time Ezternal Directors who represent
various sectors of society: the business sector, the banking system, the insurance industry and the
trade unions. The last may be asked to make recommendations. The Governor is chairman of the
Court of Directors, heads the day-to-day operations by the Bank and plays the most important role
in formulating advice or proposals to the government~)
Finally, the Bank of England is banker to the government, manages on behalf of the Treasury the
national debt and undertakes necessary open mazket operations.
The lending by the Bank to the government is legally not restricted. While the central bank was
instructed by the Treasury to aim at overfunding in the early eighties, nowadays the Bank is
aiming at full funding, i.e. to cover the public sector borrowing requirement ezactly by the selling
of government bonds to non-bank domestic investors.
2.3 )N~ance
Established in 1803, the Banque de France was nationalized under the Law of December 2, 1945,





See: Caincross (1988), P. 68.
Memorandum by the Bank of England, The relationship between the Bank of England and the
Treasury, G.B. Houae of Commons, Treasury and Civil Services Committoe, Session 1979-1980,
Memornndum on monetary policy, 1980, pp. 177-180 (in particular paragraph 14).
According to Article 2(1) of the Bank of England Act of 1946.
See: Fair (1979), p. 41 and Eizeaga (1991), pp. 6-7.
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de France to the State,...'.21) After discussions between its Governor and the Minister of
Finance regazding central bank independence,~l as a compromise the Statutes of the Banque de
France (`Les Statuts de la Banque de France') of January 3, 1973 were introduced. These Statutes
define in rather general terms the policy goals of the central bank and its relationship with the
government.~l
According to Article 1 of the Statutes: 'The Banque de France is the institution which, in the
framework of the economic and financial policy of the nation, receives from the State the general
mission of watching over the currency and credit'. Thus, the government determines the economic
and financiai policy to which the monetary policy has been subordinated. Further, Article 4 states
that `...It contributes to the prepazation and participates in the implementation of the monetary
policy that has been d~ided by the Govertunent and with the assistance, within the framework of
its competence, of the Conseil National du Crédit...'. Although the central bank is legally always
subject to directions from the government, its Governor implements in consultation with the
Minister of Finance the monetary policy in practice.~) Founded in 1945 as an institution to
broaden the political and social base for monetazy policy, the Conseil National du Ccédit with its
51 members, chaired by the Minister of Finance, advises the Governor (who is also a member),
but is not directly involved in the monetary policy making. Besides, there are weekly meetings of
the Governor and the Minister of Finance to prepare important policy decisions.
The Banque de France is headed by the Governor, who is supported by two Deputy Governors.
Both the Governor and the Deputy Governors aze appointed by the President of the Republic after
consultation with the Cabinet for an indefinite period, which makes their position rather vulnera-
ble. In practice, the term of office is limited to 5-7 years.~l In France the Governor has a
strong personal responsibility in conducting the management, which may be viewed as a factor
that increases his flexibility in negotiations.26~ The Governor is also chairman of the Conseil
Général consisting of twelve other members, among them the Deputy Governors. One member is
elected by the staff of the Banque and the remaining nine are appointed by the Cabinet on the
nomination of the Minister of Finance, representing the economic and, financial sectors of society.
1'he Minister also appoints two government auditors with the power to object to decisions by the
Conseil Général.2~ The Conseil Général supervises all activities of the Banque and must
approve afterwazds its administration, and agreements and treaties with other authorities.
As banker to the government the Banque de France finances the budget deficit of the government
within certain limits. The total of loans and advances to the government is not allowed to exceed a
specific ceiling, set by the Minister of Finance himself after agreement with the Governor and









Tranalated from: Koch (1983), p. 371. The Law of December 2, 1945 is given by: Aufricht (1967),
pp. 199-210.
See: Bouvier (1988), pp. 96-97.
ln: Banque de France, La Banque de France et la Monnaie, Paris, 1986, pp. 149-157.
See: Eizenga (1990), pp. 2,12; Eijffinger (1991), pp. 3-4.
From: Skanland (1984), p. 13.
On the contrary, a collective responsibility of the management team implies that the repre.sentative is
bound by the conseosus within the team. See: Eizenga (1990), P. 3.
Ses: Fair (1979), p. 39 and Ei7e,nga (1990), pp. 4-5.
Eizenga (1990), pp. 8-9.
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2.4 The Netherlands
The Nederlandsche Bank was established in 1814 and only nationalized in 1948. The statutory task
of the Dutch central bank regarding monetary policy is embedded in the Bank Act (`Bankwet') of
1948.29~ Article 9(1) of this Act states that 'The Bank shall have as its duty to regulate the
value of the Dutch currency in such a way as will be most conductive to the nation's prosperity
and welfare, and in doing so seek to keep the value as stable as possible'. Further, Article 9(3) of
the Act reads: `It shall supervise the credit system in pursuance of the Act on the Supervision of
the Credit System'. The latter Act gives the Bank the power to implement rules to be followed by
credit institutions in their lending. Thereby, the policy goal of the Nederlandsche Bank is to
stabilize the internal and external value of the currency, i.e. price level and exchange rate, but not
as a sole and independent objective.~l
The Bank Act also provides for a procedure, if a conflict should arise between the government
and the Bank with respect to monetary policy. According to Article 26 (1) of this Act: `In cases,
that Our minister (of Finance) may consider it necessary for the purpose of coordinating monetary
and financial policy of the Government and the policy of the Bank, he may give, after consultation
with the Bank Council, the necessary directions to the Governing Board to attain that objectives'.
Although the Minister of Finance legally has the right to give directions to the central bank, the
application of this right is always considered by both authorities as an ultimate remedy (`ultimum
remedium') because of the very complicated procedure to solve the conflict.311
Article 26 reflects the democratic principle that the Minister of Finance is responsible for central
bank policy to the parliament. Ultimately, it is to the parliament to assess whether the policy
pursued by the Bank must be deemed `conductive to the nation's prosperity and welfare'. If
parliament should back the central bank policy, this could lead to the resignation of the Minister
or the Cabinet. Therefore, the Minister of Finance has never exercised the right to give directions
until now. The Minister and the Governing Board of the Bank are compelled to reach agreement
with each other and, thus, the independence of the Bank is sufficiently guaranteed by Article
26.32)
The Nederlandsche Bank is managed by the Governing Board (`Directie') being composed of the
President, the Secretary and presently three Ezecutive Directors.331 They are nominated by a
joint meeting of the Governing Board and Supervisory Board (`Raad van Commissarissen') and
appointed by the Crown on the proposal of the Cabinet for a fixed period of seven years. In
practice, these nominations were always accepted by the Crown.~) The Supervisory Board
consisting of twelve members, appointed by the Minister of Finance, supervises the Governing
29) This Act is given in: Wettea Binnenlands Geldwezen, Zwolle, 1979, pp. 5-27. See also: Eizenga
(1983), p. 10.
See: Eijffmger ( 1986), PP. 8-9 and Eizenga (1987), p. 12.
This procedure is extensively discussed by: A.M. de Jong, De Wetgeving nopens De Nederlandsche
Bank, 1814-1958, een óistorische studie, The Hague, 1960.
From: Eizeaga (1987), pp. 13-14.
Article 22 of the Bank Act providea the possibility to appoint at most five Executive Directors. 1'he
Governing Board has a collective responsibility for the Bank's management.







Board. Finally, the Bank Council (`Bankraad') of seventeen members is chaired by the Royal
Commissioner (`Koninklijk Commissaris') and may seek information from the Bank and offer
independent advice to the Minister of Finance.
The Nederlandsche Bank acts also as banker to the government, but may not contribute to
monetary financing of the budget deficit. The Bank must grant non-interest-beazing advance to
strengthen the cash position of the government and may grant other credits on a temporary
base.35)
2.5 Belgium
Established in 1850, the National Bank of Belgium (`Nationale Bank van Belgié') is owned half by
the state and half by the public.~) The legal base for the functioning of the Belgian central
bank are the Organic Law (`Organieke Wet') and the Statutes of 1939, which provide no specific
objectives for the Bank.3~ Article 29 of the Organic Law states the following: `The Minister of
Finance shall have the right to supervise all the operations of the Bank. He may object to the
execution of any measure which would be contrary to the Law, the Statutes or the interests of the
State. This supervision shall be entrusted to a Government Commissioner'. According to Article
30 of this Law: `The Government Commissioner is appointed by the Crown. He shall supervise
all the operations of the Bank. He may suspend and report to the Minister of Finance, every
decision that would be contrary to the Laws, the Statutes or the interests of the Staté ,3s)
Therefore, the National Bank of Belgium can not be considered as formally independent of the
government. The Bank is forbidden to pursue targets conflicting with the general objectives of the
government.39) Nevertheless, the relationship between the central bank and government has
changed, in favour of more independence, by the reform of the money market and monetary
policy instruments which started on January, 29, 1991. This reform was intended to improve the
access to the market for Treasury bills, to introduce a regime of primary dealers and to innovate
and extend the monetary policy instruments. The reform was mainly motivated by European
economic and monetary integration and the need for more competition on the national financial
markets and for better management of the government debt and financing of the budget deficit. As
a consequence of this reform, the responsibility of the central bank for monetary policy was more
clearly defined and its touch with financial markets on behalf of policy making improved.~)
The Board of Directors (`Bestuucscomité') of the National Bank of Belgium is made up of the
Governor and three to six Directors of which one acts as Deputy Governor. The Governor and







The advancos may not ezceed 150 million guilders.
The latter half is held by various authorities and, thus, under indirecl control of the yovernment.
The Organic Law and Statutes are revised on January 2 aod 23, 1991. See: Belgisch Staatsblad,
Jaauary, 25 and 29, 1991.
This Commissioner is mostly the èighest Miaistry ofFinance official.
However, Fair (1979) is of the opinion that `...in practice the National Bank is largely indepeadent' (p.
37).
See: Hervorming van het monetair beleidsinstrumentarium, aspacten en documenten, Belgische
Vereniging van Baalcea, No. 114, January 1991, p.25.
Page 8
Board of Directors is chaired by the Governor and collectively responsible for the management of
the Bank and the formulation of monetary policy. It may change the discount rate and the rate for
advances in a case of emergency, but must report to the Council of Regency (`Regentenraad').
The Council of Regency determines, óowever, the policy goals of the Bank and deals with general
questions concerning the Bank, the currency, credits and the economic development 411 The
Council of Regency consists of the Board of Directors and ten Regents elected by the General
Meeting of Shareholders for a period of three years, representing the Minister of Finance (3),
fmancial institutions (2), trade unions (2) and organisations of industry, commerce and agriculture
(3). The Governor is chairman and has a decisive vote. Finally, the General Meeting elects the
Boazd of Censors with eight to ten members for a period of three years approving the balance
sheet of and the expenditure by the Bank.42)
As banker to the government the National Bank of Belgium may conduct open mazket operations
to finance the budget deficit only on a temporary base.43) The Minister of Finance, having a
joint responsibility for this before the reform, is nowadays bound to the restrictions set by the
market and expected to avoid monetazy financing.
2.6 Germany
The legal predecessors of the Deutsche Bundesbank were the Reichsbank, established in 1876, and
the Bank deutscher Lánder, founded together with the introduction of the Deutsche Mark by the
currency reform of 1948. The Deutsche Bundesbank was established by the Deutsche Bundesbank
Act (`Gesetz uber die Deutsche Bundesbank') of 1957~) Its main policy goals are provided for
in Article 3 of this Act: `The Deutsche Bundesbank shall regulate the amount of money in
circulation and of credit supplied to the economy, using the monetary powers conferred on it by
this Act, with the aim of safeguazding the currency, and shall arrange for the handling by banks
of domestic and external payments'. Article 3 cleazly reflects the special responsibility of the
central bank for maintaining the internal and external value of the currency, i.e. price level and
exchange rate.4S~ The relationship between the Bundesbank and the federal government is
embedded in Article 12 of the Act reading: 'Without prejudice to the performance of its functions,
the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be required tu support the general economic policy of the Federal
Government. In ezercising the powers conferred on it by this Act it shall be independent of
instructions from the Federal Government'. Thus, Article 12 guarantees the independence of the
central bank regarding monetary policy making. It should be noticed that the Act does not cover
any procedures in case of a major conflict between the Bundesbank and the federal government.
Nevertheless, Article 13 of the Act provides for certain procedures for the coordination of






According to Articles 63 and 64 of the Statutes of 1939.
The Geaeral Council consisting of the Governor, Directors, Regents and Censors conside~s the general
positioa of the Bank.
From: Skaoland ( 1984), p. 25. The limit is 15 billion Belgian francs.
See; The Deutache Bundesbank - Its monetary policy instruments and functions, Deutsche Bundesbank-
Special Series, No. 7, 2nd edition, Frankfurt-am-Main, Oktober 1987, pp. 105-130.
For an interpretation: Eizenga ( 1987), pp. 2-12 aad Eijffmger (1991), pp. 3-5.
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independent bodies. According to Article 13 (2,3) members of government may attend meetings of
the Central Bank Council, without voting right, and the President of the Bank those of the
government on invitation.~) Furthermore, Article 1 of the Act to promote the Stability and the
Growth of the Economic (`Gesetz zur Fbrderung der Stabilitát und des Wachstum der Wirtschaft')
of 1967 states that monetary and economic policy measures must contribute at the same time to
price stability, high employment and to ezternal equilibrium with steady and satisfactory economic
growth-4~
The Central Bank Council (`Zentralbankrat') of the Deutsche Bundesbank is made up of the
Directorate (`Direktorium') and the Presidents of the Landeszentralbanken (main offices). The
Council determines monetary policy under chairmanship of the President or Deputy President of
the Bundesbank and meets every two weeks.~) The Directorate, consisting of the President,
Deputy President and at most eight (now four) other members, implements the decisions taken by
the Central Bank Council. The at most ten members of the Directorate are appointed by the
President of the Federal Republic on the nomination of the Federal Government, while the eleven
Presidents of the Landeszentralbanken are appointed by him on the nomination of the Bundesrat
based on a proposal by the Government of the Land concemed, all after consultation of the
Central Bank Council. Both the members of the Directorate and the Presidents of the Landeszen-
tralbanken have a maximum term of office of eight years which is usually realized.49) During
this term they can not be removed from office on political grounds. The appointment of the
members of the Central Bank Council reflects also a large degree of independence of the
Bundesbank.
As banker to the government, the Deutsche Bundesbank may grant short-term advances in the
form of book credit and credit against Treasury bills within certain limits, according to Article 20
(1) of the Deutsche Bundesbank Act. These credit ceilings are fized in nominal terms and, thus,
detrease every year in real terms.~)
2.7 Japan
Established in 1882, the Bank of Japan was reorganized by the Bank of Japan Law of 1942St)
According to Article 1 of this Law: `The Bank of Japan has for its object the regulation of the
currency, the control and facilitation of credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering of
the credit system, pursuant to the national policy, in order that the general economic activities of
the nation might adequately be enhanced'. The latter part of Article 1 may be taken to mean'...to







In practice, these members only attend Ceotral Banlc Council maetings with important issues. Sae:
Skanland (1984), P. 18.
Accordíng to Eizenga (1987), p. 3: '...monetary etability, with regard to both the domestic and the
eztemal value of the currency, ranks with the other objectives of economic policy.'
The Centnil Baak Council has a collective responsibility.
The minimum term of office is two years. See: E'v.eaga (1987), p. 4.
E.g. in 1967 this was fized for the federal governmeat st DM 6 billion.
This Law was amended in 1949 to found the Policy Board, the highest policy making body of the
Bank. See: Aufricht (1961), pp. 423-448.
An interpretation is given by: Suzuki (1987), pp. 305-312.
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Bank are to stabilize the value of the currency and to maintain orderly credit conditions.
Regarding the relationship between the central bank and government, Article 43 states that: `The
competent Minister (of Finance) may, if deemed particulazly necessary for the attainment of the
object of tàe Bank of Japan, order the Bank to undertake any necessary business, or order
alterations in the By-Laws as well as other necessary actions'. Although the Minister, formally,
has the right to give instructions, in practice this right has never been used as a result of the
regular, informal contacts between Bank management and government.S3~ With respect to its
main goal, price stability, the actual influence of the Bank is mucó greater than what is legally
defined. For example, the Bank of Japan has been fairly succesful in advocating the liberalization
of Japanese financial markets and in arguing for a more mazket~riented implementation of
monetary policy, which the Ministry of Finance óas resisted for a long time.~l This position of
the central bank can be explained by the consequences of financial liberalization for the balance of
power between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. 7ite influence of the Ministry is,
above all, based on financial regulation (regulatory leverage) and decreases gradually by financial
liberalization. However, the Bank of Japan derives its influence mainly from guiding the financial
markets (mazket leverage), which increases by the strengthening of market forces. Thereby, the
independence of the central bank continues to grow.ss)
~e highest policy making body of the Banlc of Japan is the Policy Board, consisting of the
Governor, two representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Agency
(without voting right) and four other members, representing banking (2), commerce and industry
(1), and agriculture (1). The Governor and the other members of the Policy Board are appointed
by the Cabinet for a period of five and four yeazs respectively. Since 1969, the Governor has been
chosen alternately from Bank officials and former Ministry of Finance officials~l The Gover-
nor conducts the operations of the Bank according to the directions of the Policy Boazd and heads
the Executive Boazd, which further includes two Deputy Governors (formerly one), at least three
Executive Directors and two Executive Auditors (now six and four respectively), and a number of
Counsellors.5~ The Deputy Governors are appointed by the Cabinet for five yeazs, while the
other members of the Executive Board by the Minister of Finance on recommendation of the
Governor for two to four yeazs. Despite the fact that the Policy Board is, from a legal point of
view, the most important policy making body, the major responsibility for formulating monetazy
policy resides with the Executive Boazd.ss)
The Bank of Japan, acting as banker to the government, may make advances without taking any
collateral and subscribe to or buy government bonds. The latter has not been used since 1948.
Nevertheless, the Bank has provided in the form of underwriting of governments bills for short-







Suzuki ( 1987) means: `In reality, the maoagement of monetary policy is carried out under the
responsibility of the Bank of Japan from an indepeodeat point of view' (p. 314).
See: Cargill ( 1989), P. 38.
For an analysis of this process: Eijffinger 8c Van Rixtel (1992), p. 24.
See also: The Economist, Central Banks: America v. Japan - The rewards of independence, Jmuary,
25, 1992, p. 22.
Fmm: The Bank of lapan, Annual Review 1991, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 35-36.




The Banca d'Italia, established in 1893, is owned partially, through public financial institutions,
by the State.~) The legal base for its functioning are the Statutes (`Statuto
della Banca d'Italia') of 1936, which provide no specific objectives for the central bank.bl~ Tfie
relationship between the Banca d'Italia and the government is embedded in Article 20 of the
Statutes stating that the Board of Directors (`Comitato') is just responsible for the general
management of the central bank and not for monetary policy making. Furthermore, Article 25
reads: `He (the Governor) shap make proposals to the Minister of the Treasury concerning change
in the discount rates and in the interest rate on advances'. Obviously, the Governor prepares
monetary policy and the Minister of the Treasury has to approve it formally.~) The Statutes of
1936 were amended in 1947 by providing the Banca d'Italia with supervision on the financial
system and by the foundation of the Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings (`Comitato
Interministeriale per il Credito e il Risparmio' or CIRC).63) According to Article 1 of the
Decree of 1947, the CICR,'...whose duty it shall be to supervise, at the highest level, the
safeguarding of savings, the carrying on of credit activities, and exchange matters', will give
directives to the central bank for its operations. The CIRC is made up of the most important
ministers and the Governor, and chaired by the Minister of the Treasury. In general, this
committee determines the goals of monetary policy with the Banca d'Italia in an advisory role.
The central bank has always been integrated with economic policy making, which explains why it
scarcely had any conflict with the Treasury. Until the mid-seventies the central bank was, clearly,
subordinated to the government. However, from 1975 on the Banca d'Italia paid more attention to
gaining independence with respect to monetary policy.~l
The Governor, having a personal responsibility for the implementation of monetary policy, is
appointed by the Board of Directors of the Banca d'Italia, for an indefinite term of office. The
Board of Directors consists of thirteen Directors, elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders
at the thirteen regional offices of the central bank for a fixed period of three years, the Governor
with a casting vote and a representative of the Ministry of the Treasury as an observer without
voting right. This representative is empowered to suspend the execution of any decision, which he
considers to be contrary to the law, regulations or Statutes of the central bank, with five days at
most.ó5~ Although the appointment of Governor and Directors seems to be independent of the








For this: Suzuki (1987), p. 311.
From: Fair (1979), p. 39.
See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 421-440.
Very recently, the Minister and former Governor has mrde a bill to give the central bank full authority
regarding discount policy.
The Decree oa the Intermiaisterial Committee for Credit and Savings of 1947, in: Aufricht (1967), pp.
453~55.
See: Nudozti (1988), p. 179.
According to Article 18 of the Statutes of 1936. See also: Fair (1979), p. 39.
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approved by decree of the President of the Republic on the proposal of the President of the
Council of Ministers in agreement with the Minister of the Treasury, the Council of Ministers
having been heard'.
As banl~er to the governntent, the Banca d'Italia used to be obliged to buy Treasury bills, which
had not beea taken up by the banks, and to grant, thereby, unlimited monetary financing of the
budget deficit. In 1981, the seperation of the responsibilities (`divorzio') between central bank and
government discharged the Banca d'Italia from this obligation. From that year, the central bank
acts as one of the participants on the market for Treasury bills and, thus, has more flexibility.
Nevertheless, dte Treasury still may call on credit facilities of the Banca d'Italia, without
consultation, up to a maximum of 14 96 of total spending by the government~)
2.9 Switzerland
Fstablished in 1905, the Swiss National Bank (`Schweizerische Nationalbank') has enjoyed a high
degree of independence from the government, reflecting the deep-rooted distrust of the Swiss
public in centralized approaches to policy making.b~ The main policy goals of the Swiss central
bank are provided for in Article 2(1) of the Federal Law on the Swiss National Bank (`Bundesge-
setz uber die Schweizerische Nationalbank') of 1953: `The principal taslc of the National Bank
shall be to regulate the country's monetary circulation, facilitate payments transactions, and
implement a credit and monetary policy serving the general interests of the wuntry. It shall advise
the Federal authorities in monetary matters.'~) The cen[ral bank interprets this Article as a
mandate to achieve and to maintain a stable price level, which view is shared by the federal
government and largely accepted by the public~) The relationship between the Swiss National
Battk and the federal government (`Bundesrat') is one of legal and administrative separation. The
National Bank Law does not contain any provision giving the government influence on monetary
policy making. In case of important policy decisions, both authorities should consult each other,
but mutual consent is not required.~o) The independence of the central bank is also guaranteed
by Article 63, limiting the competence of the federal parliament to approving an increase in the
Bank's basic capital and that of the federal government to appointing representatives to the Bank
Council, the members of the Directorate, their deputies and the managers of the branch offices, to
deciding in case of a dispute between a canton and the Bank regarding the establishment of a
branch office or an agency, to approving the denominations of notes to be issued and the share of
the cantons in the Bank's net profit and to other formal approvals.





Theae advances in curreat-account to the government are based on Decree 544 of 1948. During the
eighties, the Treasury made use of this instrument for monetary financing of the budget deficit to a
substantial degree.
From: Rich (1989), p. 1.
Thia Lrw should be read in conjunction with Article 39 of the Federal Constitution amended in 1951.
See: Aufricht (1967), pp. 705-724.
For an interpretatioa; Skenland (1984), P. 7 md Rich (1989), p. 7.
See slso: Slcanland (1984), p. 22-
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Bank and has the right to participate in the setting of the Bank's official lending rates ~t~
Representing the various parts (cantons) of the country, this Bank Committee is made up of the
Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Banlc Council (`Bankrat') and eight other members,
which aze appointed by the Banr Council for a fixed period of four yeazs. The Bank Council,
consisting of forty members, is responsible for the supervision and control of the Bank's
management, but plays a limited role with respect to monetary policy. Its Chairman, Deputy
Chairman and twenty-three other members are appointed by the federal government and the
remaining fifteEn members aze elected by the General Me~ing of Shareholders also for a period
of four years.n) Thus, only one-fifth of the Bank Committee and five-eighth of the Bank
Council are directly appointed by the federal government. Nevertheless, one could azgue that,
indirectly, the government has more influence in appoindng the Bank Committee through the Bank
Council. Finally, the highest managing and executive authority is the Directorate (`Direktorium')
of the Bank, which is composed of three members elected by the federal government, on
recommendation of the Bank Council, for a fized term of six years.73~ The government also ap-
points among these three members a President and a Vice-President, although there is a collective
responsibility.
The Swiss National Bank acting as banker to the federal government may grant, according to
Article 14 (4) of the National Bank Law, interest-beazing advances in current-account at up to ten
days' notice against government bonds and other short-term credit facilities to strengthen the
government's cash position. However, the central bank is legally prevented from direct lending to
the government as a source of monetary financing.74)
2.10 AustraGa
The Reserve Bank of Australia, established in 1911, was made just a full-bodied central bank by
the Reserve Bank Act of 195975~ constituting the functions, responsibilities and competence of
the Australian central bank. The functions of its Boazd are set out in Article 10 (2) of this Act: `It
is the duty of the Boazd, within the limits of its powers, to ensure that the monetary and banking
policy of the Bank is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia and that the
powers of the Bank under this Act, the Banking Act 1959 and the regulations under that Act aze
exercised in such a manner as, in the opinion of the Board, will best contribute to:
(a) the stability of the currency of Australia;
(b) the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and
(c) the economic prosperity and welfare of the people in Australia'.
Thus, the threefold policy goal of the Reserve Bank also includes the fostering of economic
activity and employment. Regazding monetary policy making the central bank is bound to inform






According to Rich (1989), óowever, this right `...is not a significant as it may seem at first sight
because theae rates no longer constitute important policy instruments in Switzerland' (p. 6).
The fedeml govemment holds no shares. See: Fair (1979), p. 41.
To the Directorate may be added deputies and department managers.
Compare also: Skanland (1984), p. 15.
Tbe Reaerve Baok Act of 1959 is given by: Aufricht (1961), pp. 53-71.
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the Treasury shall establish a close liaison witó each other and shall keep each other fully
informed on all matters which jointly concern the Bank and the D~artrnent of the Treasury'
(Article 13). In practice, the relationship between the Reserve Bank and the federal government is
chazacterized by both formal and informal contacts.7ó) Nevertheless, the Bank is completely
subordinated to the Secretary of the Treasury, being the final competent authority with respect to
monetary policy. In case of differences of opinion between the central bank and the Treasury,
Article 11 (2) states that '...the Treasurer and the Boazd shall endeavour to reach agree-
ment.'~
Furthermore, according to Article 50 (1) of the Banking Act of 1959 the Reserve Bank's setting of
rates on discounts and advances needs to be approved by the Treasury 78) So, the central bank
is more or less an agent of the government.
The Reserve Bank Boazd, responsible for implementing monetary policy, consists of the
Governor, the Deputy Governor, the Secretary to the Treasury as an ex offico member and seven
other members. The Governor and Deputy Governor are appointed by the Governor-General (the
executive branch of the federal government) for a term of office, not exceeding seven years. The
seven other members comprise at most two members who are officers of the Banlc or Public
Service, holding office `...during the pleasure of the Governor-General'79), and at least five
members selected from the academic, agricultural and general business sector by the Governor-
General for a fued period of five yeazs. The Governor is chairman of the Boazd and has a casting
vote. The government official on the Board has a voting right.
As banker to the federal government, the Reserve Bank of Australia is obliged to grant direct
lending to the federal government without any restrictions. Moreover, government borcowing
from the central bank is guazanteed by the issue of so-called `public' Treasury bills, not available
for public subscription.~)
Thus, the Reserve Bank may be compelled to monetary financing of the budget deficit.
2.11 United States
Established in 1913, the Federal Reserve System is a federal government authority comprising the
twelve Federal Reserve Banks, whose shares are owned by commercial banks being its members,
and formerly (until 1935) the Federal Reserve Boazd as it main policy making body. The legal
base for its functioning was embedded in the Federal Reserve Act of 191381) The Preamble of







An example of a formal contact between the Bank and federal government officials is the Joint
Economic Forecasing Group. See: The Reserve Bank of Australia, Functions and Operntions, Sydneay,
1984, P. 7.
For the procedure to aeWe such conflicts: Article 11 (2) - I 1(7) of the Reserve Bank Act of 1959.
However, Masciaadaro and Tabellini ( 1988) mean that recently: '...the central bank has not formally
promulgated regulations, but has informed the banks of its goals concerning the rates of interest,
following discussions...' (p. 149).
Acccording to Article 14 (3) of the Reserve Bank Act of 1959.
See: Masciandam and Tabellini (1988), p. 147.
See also: Board of Govemors, The Federal Reserve System; Purposes and Functions, Washington,
D.C., 1984. An interpretation can be found in: Cargill ( 1989), PP. 21-32.
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of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting
commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and
for other purposes'. The Federal Reserve Act fails to describe the role the System currently plays
in terms of economic stabilization reflecting the then dominant view that this was not required. By
the Banking Act of 1933 the Federal Reserve Board was granted more autonomy vis-à-vis the
Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was creatad to make
policy recommendation to the Board for conducting open market operations.~l Further, the
Banking Act of 1935 replaced the Federal Reserve Boazd by the Board of Governors and
strenghtened its position by removing the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer from the
Board. Through the `Accord' of 1951 the Federal Reserve gained more autonomy as a consequen-
ce of its agreement with the Treasury that its open mazket policy should no longer support the
mazket for government debt.83) The goals of the central bank regarding monetary policy were
just clearly formulated in section 2A of the 1977 amendment to the Act by stating that: `The
Boazd of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall
maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the econo-
my's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote the goals of maximum employ-
ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates'. So, the Federal Reserve should aim
both at price stability and at economic activity and employment.~l Furthermore, the Humphre-
y-Hawkins Act of 1978 was meant to improve the coordination of economic and monetary policy
between the federal government, Congress (parliament) and Federal Reserve by reporting
requirements for the central bank to Senate and House of Representatives at semi-annual hearings
on the Board's and FOMC's objectives and plans with respect to the growth of monetary and
credit aggregates for the upcoming twelve months, taking account of past and prospective
development in production, employment and prices.85~ Thus, the implementation of monetary
and credit targeting is crucial for this congressional supervision. In practice, both the Federal
Reserve and the government have a shazed responsibility for monetary policy making. Although
the central bank maintained the same degree of formal autonomy, it lost its committed indepen-
dence after the mid-1960's.~l Clearly, the Federal Reserve being under political pressure,
especially in the year before the Presidential election, receives now and then informal directives
from the Treasury.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, acting as its highest policy making body,
is composed of seven members which are selected in order to maintain a geographical balance and
a balance between bankers and non-bankers. These seven Governors are appointed by the
President of the United States for a fized period of fourteen years, with approval by the Senate.






For the creation of the FOMC: Akhtar end Howe (1991), p. 364.
During the Second World War the stabiliution of this market had become the principal function of the
System. See: Eizenga (1983), p. 4.
For a receat evaluation of the `twin objxtives': The Economist, Central Baoks: America v. Japan -
The rewarda of indepeadeoce, January, 25, 1992, PP. 22-23.
Accordiag to Eizenga (1983) '...thia Act does not derogate from the independeace of the FED witè
regard to ita policies' (p. 6). He calls it `independeat within the government' (pp. 7-9).
See also: Het7e1 (1990), P. 170.
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members of the Boazd of Governors as Chairman and Vice-Chairman for a fued period of four
years.e~ Political influence on the appointment of the Board is minimalized by the long term of
office, exceeding more than three administratioac, and the impossibility of dismissal on political
grounds.~) Furthermore, the formulation of global monetazy targets its carried out by the
FOMC.89yfhe FOMC is made up of the Board of Governors and five of the twelve Presidents
of the Federal Reserve Banks. The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
conducting open market operations and exchange mazket intervendons on behalf of the System, is
an ex officio member of the FOMC. The other four members are elected for a period of one year
on a rotating basis. The Presidents of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks aze appointed by the
Board of Directors of each Bank, with consent of the Boazd of Governors.~
Traditionally, the Federal Reserve System acts as banker to the federal government. However, the
central bank is not obliged to grant direct lending to the government. The Treasury is fully
responsible for financing the budget deficit and may not resort to monetary financing. According
to the `Accord' of 1951, the System will only buy and sell government debt within the framework
of its open mazket policy.
2.12 Canada
The Bank of Canada, only established in 1935, had its functioning originally based on the Bank of
Canada Act of 1934.91) The policy goals of the Canadian central bank were given in the
Preamble of this Act, reading: `Whereas it is desirable to establish a central bank in Canada to
regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to control and
protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its influence fluctuations
in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so faz as may be possible within
the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the economic and financial welfare of the
Dominion'. Until 1967, this Act did not confine the threefold task of the central bank regazding
monetary policy making.~) However, in 1967 the relationship between the Bank of Canada and
the federal government was changed by the introduction of the Bank of Canada Act of 1967 93)
This was caused by a major conflict of the Governor with the Minister of Finance on the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. The Governor, wanting to conduct a restrictive policy, was forced
to resign. 7'he Act of 1967 gave the Minister of Finance the right to promulgate instructions to the
Bank and, therefore, the ultimate authority for monetazy policy. Article 14 (1) of the revised Act








From: Krooes and Samuelson (1969), pp. 2913-2914.
Bade and Parkin ( 1988) argue that: `..., the Board enjoys a greater measurc of independence than do
those whoae appointments are more closely coterminous with those of governmentsladministrations' (p.
13).
See: Eizenga (1983), p. 2.
For legislative pmposals to restructure it: Akhtar and Howe (1991), p. 358.
See: Aufricót (1961), pp. 89-105.
According to Article 14 (1) of the Act of 1934, the Governor had power to veto any action or decision
of the Board of Directors or Executive Committee, whicó could be overruled by the federal govem-
meat.
In: The Revisad Statutes of Caoada, 1970, Vol. 1, Ottawa, 1970.
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relation to general economic policy'. Furthermore, Article 14 (2) continues: `If, notwithstanding
the consultations provided for in Subsection (1) there should emerge a difference of opinion
between the Ministec and the Bank concerning the monetary policy to be followed, the Minister
may, after consultation with the Governor in Council (executive branch of government), give to
the Governor a written direction concerning monetary policy, in specified terms, and the Bank
shall comply with such directive'.~) Although the Minister of Finance has, up to now, never
used his right to give instructions, this possibility has severely affected the independence of the
central bank after 1967.
The highest policy making body of the Bank of Canada is its Board of Directors, consisting of the
Governor, Deputy Governor, twelve Directors and the Deputy Minister of Finance as an ex
officio member without voting power~ Both the Governor and the Deputy Govetitor are
appointed by the Directors, with the approval of the Governor in Council, for a fixed period of
seven years. The Minister of Finance appoints the twelve Directors~), with the consent of the
Governor in Council, for a period of three years. The (Deputy) Governor and Directors may be
re-appointed. The Governor is the chief executive officer and supervises the Bank, while the
Directors are more concerned with the internal functioning of the Bank. Moreover, the Bank has
an Executive Committee, which is competent to deal with any matter within the competence of the
Board. The Ezecutive Committee is composed of the Governor, Deputy Governor, two Directors
and the Deputy Minister of Finance and mainly responsible for the implementation of monetary
policy.
The Bank of Canada is obliged to act as banker to the federal government without charge and, by
agreement, also to the government of any province. According to Article 18 (1), paragraphs (i)
and (j) the Bank may make loans or advances to the government for periods no longer than six
months, and not exceeding one-third of the estimated revenue in the fiscal year for the federal




For an interprotation, ece also: Bade and Parkin ( 1988), p. 10.
Notice that the govemmeat official in the Board of Governors of the Reserve Baok of Australia, on the
contrary, has voting power.
They will be eelected from `diversified occupationa' and in pnctice, from different regiona of Caaada.
See: Fair (1979), p. 37.
This has not been doae since the early 1960s. See: Masciaodaro and Tabellini ( 1988), P. 148.
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3 INDICES OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
3.1 Bade and Parkin's Courageous Attempt
A seminal paper concerning indices of central bank independence is Bade and Parkin (1988) (BP).
The paper investigates the cross-country relationship between monetary policies and the laws
which establisó and delimit the powers of central banks. The study is empirical and deals with the
experience of twelve industrial countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands the United Kingdom and the United States, Sweden and Switzerland)
during the floadng exchange rate years 19~2 to 1986~1.
They describe the central bank laws of the twelve countries focusing on three features:
(i) The relationship b~ween central banks and government in the formulation of monetary
policy
(ii) The procedures for appointing and removing central bank directors
(iii) Ttte financial and budgetary relations between the central bank and the government.
On the basis of features (i) and (ii) BP classify the twelve central banks according to their degrees
of nolicy indet7endence. On the basis of feature (iii) they identify the degree of financial ind~Qen-
dence from government.
They conclude that central banks whicó are independent both in policy-making and in the
appointment of directors deliver a lower rate of inflation than other central bank types. However,
no monetary policy differences appear to arise from the financial relationships between the central
bank and government.
(i) Relationships between central banks and government in the formulation of monetary policy
After examining the central bank laws and Aufricht (1961, 1967), BP find that the central banks
of Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden are
subordinated to the central governments in the formulation and conduct of monetary policy. On
the other hand, those of Germany, Japan, the United States and Switzerland have varying degrees
of independence from central government. The Bank of Canada underwent a change in status in
1967. Before 1967 it was largely independent of the government but since then it had its legislated
powers diminished.
BP's results concerning the relationship between the central bank and the government in monetary
policy making can be summarized in Table lA.~l
~l BP (p. 18) point out t17at a commitment to a fixed exchange rate leaves monetary policy with the task
of determining the stock of foreign reserves. Therefore, tèey think it pointless to look to the effacts of
c~hal bank laws on monetary policy in a fixed ezchange rate era. Empirical support for this view can
be found in De Haan ea Messcheadorp (1991), pp. 3-4.
~l Based on Table 1 in Bade and Parkin (1988).
tral Bank I.aws: Polic3' ~~S
Ff~al
cat~vy C~1 aamt 1.... Ared~(s) otr.r so.ttaa A.~ro~ey
(soa note below) (i) ~
Amtra~a Reoerve Bnnk Act 1959-1973 1I,13,50 Aufricht (1961), pp 49, 55, 56 y
gdptm Orgaaíc Lw of the Natioa~l 29,30 Aufiicht (1967), p 65 8
Bank
Bank of Can~da Act IS Aufricht (1961), pp 93-96 b(1967-)
Caoada Revi~ed Sutute~ ofC~da 1970, 14 ;(1967t)
Vol 1(Badt of Cuuda Act 1967)
Fnute Lw coocetning the Natioual Credit 13 WJ~on (1962), p 34 .
Council, December 2, 1945 Aufricht (1967), p 305
Banque de Fnnce, Loi du 3 j~nvier 1973, y
Ikcret du 30 jamier 1973, P~rie
4
Italy Sutute of the Badt of IWy 1936 20,25 Aufricht (1967), pp 427, 429 y
Netèerlmda Banc Act 1948, De Nederland~che Aufricht (1967), p 471 y
Bank NV 26 (1)
~ Sverige~ Riskbank Act 1934 32,38 Aufricht (1967), pp 668-669, 670 s
Usfed Ritgdom Baak of F~tgland Act 1946 4(1) Aufricht ( 1961), p 186 Y
Japnt ~e BLnt of lapan Lw, By-Lw~ 13(2) b
rwnd the Law Corcerning Raerve
Depwit Requiremeru Syetem
United Sutes Fedenl Reserve Act 1913 Fedenl Reaetve Bulletin December 1977,
Banlung Act 1935 p. I076
Fedenl Reierve Refonm Act 1977 202 b
Germaq Ge~etz 3ber die Dwnche 6(1),12 Aufricht (1967), p 252, 255,
B~nde~nk 1957 13, 13(2)h 256 b
Switzerlsnd Bunde~geua uber die Schweizeriache 63 Aufricht (1967), pp 721 6
Natiorval~ank 19ï7
Notrs: (a) b- banlt; 8- Yovemment




This table gives the evidence by BP (columns (2}(4)) and their conclusion past column) regazding
the fuial authority in monetary policy making.
For instance, considering the United Kingdom the following remark can be made. Evidence used
by BP is Aufricht's (1967) account of Article 4(1), of the Bank of England Act of 1946 which
reads: "The Treasury may from time to time give such d'uections to the Banlc as, after consultation
with the Governor of the bank, they think necessary in the public interest". It is this Article which
BP use to classify the government as the final policy authority.
(ii) Procedures for appointing and removing central bank directors
Furthermore, BP ezamine the influence that governments can exercise through their control over
the appointment and removal of inembers of the policy board. In general, if central banks have
some provision for policy boazd members to be appointed independently of government and also
where appointments enjoy a lengthy period of time, there may be a reduction in the influence
which governments may ezercise on central bank policy.
They find that in all cases where the government is responsible for the formulation of monetary
policy (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) and
Sweden, it also appoints over 12114 (in the case Canada) of the policy board.
In the other cases, the central bank being the final policy authority, two sub-sets can be distinguis-
hed. On the one hand we discern Japan and the United States with central banlcs of which all
boazd members are appointed by the government. On the other hand, there aze Germany and
Switzerland with respectively 10121 and 1I5 of the policy boazd appointed by the government.
The ability to remove central bank directors depends on the length of their appointments. This
ranges from as little as three years (Canada, Italy, Sweden) to as long as fourteen years for
ordinary policy boazd members in the case of the United States.
BP's results concerning the procedures for appointing and removing central bank directors can be
summazized in Table 1B.t~1
On the basis of feature (i) the relationship between central banks and government in the formulati-
on of monetary policy (Table lA) and feature (ii) the procedures for appointing and removing
central bank directors (Table 1B), BP construct their indez of policy independence. The degree of
policy independence is determined using three criteria:
1 Is the bank the final policy authority (according to Table lA)?
~ Is there no government official on the bank board (according to Table 1B)?
~ Are some board appointments made independent of the government (according to Table 1B)?
Since each criterion can be met or not, 23 potential policy types can be distinguished. This is
summarized in Table 2A.
t~ Based on Table 1 ia Bade aad Parlcin (1988).
Table 1B
Central Bank Laws: Appoinlment of Directors
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However, in all cases were the government is responsible for the formulation of monetary policy,
it also appoints over 12114 of the policy board. That is, there is no central bank which makes
some board appointments independent of the government, although it is not in charge of monetary
policy. Therefore, types (a) and (b) do not ezist.
Moreover, a central bank being itself in charge of monetary policy and also having a government
official on its board (types (c) and (d)), does not ezisttoq
Therefore, the potential policy types (a)-(d) do not occur in reality. This means that no actual
central bank corresponds to the first four configurations of institutional features.
So, only the bottom half of Table 2A is relevant for the construction of the BP index of policy
independence. The overall degree of policy independence is determined by a combination of
attributes ~-~. It should be noticed that there is no non-arbitrary way of aggregating them.
However, from Table 2A it can be easily seen that BP choose the simplest one: they simply
summed the attributes possessed by the central bank, meaning that each amibute is weighted
equally.
Thus, the four remaining (existing) central bank types are ranked from 1 peast independent) to 4
(most independent) depending on the number of asterisks. For instance, the least independent
central bank (zero asterisks) is not in charge of monetary policy, has a government official on the
board, and does not make any board appointments independent of government.
101) ~~~ ~~s case the preaeace of a govecnmeat officisl without voting power on the policy board
would not make much sense.
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(iii) Financial and budgetary relations between central banks and government
Acoording to BP (p. 1~ the main reason for examining tèis dimension of central bank law is the a
priori notion, suggested by the theory of buresucracy, that the more closely the budget of an
agency is monitored by the principal, the more closely the agency pursues the objectives of the
principal and the less closely it is able to pursue its own objectives. In particulaz, BP focus on
budgetary autonomy, determination of boazd members' salazies and profit allocation.
Eleven of the twelve central banlcs, the exception being the Bank of Japan, have complete
budgetary autonomy. T6e Bank of Japan must obtain prior approval from tóe government of its
budgetary expenditures.
Board members' salaries are fixed either directly by the government (Australia, France, Japan,
Sweden, and the United States) or by the bank subject to varying degrees of government approval
(Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
All the central banks are required to pay their residual profits to their respective govemments. In
some cases (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United
States) the profits aze allocated after meeting transfers to reserves and prior claims set out in the
relevant central bank laws. In other cases, either the central bank (LTnited Kingdom) or the
government (Australia, France, Japan, Sweden) decides on the profit allocation between reserves
and the amount paid to the government.
BP's results concerning the fmancial and budgetazy relations between central banks and govern-
ments can be summarized in Table 1C.~ml
As we mentioned before, BP identify tbe degree of financial independence by focusing on three
criteria:
4 Does the banlc have budgetazy autonomy?
~ Does the bank determine boazd members' salazies?
~ Does the bank decide on profit allocation?
Again, there aze 23 potential financial types. This is summarized in Table 2C.
1~1 Baaod on Table 2 in Bade and Pati~in (1988).
Table 1C
Centrr~l Bank Laws: F'inancial T7Pe
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As with the construction of the policy indez, a lot of hypothetical financial types, i.e. the first
four rows of Table 2C, aze not to be found among the twelve industrial countries. Therefore,
only the bottom óalf of Table 2C is relevant for the construction of the BP indez of financial
independence. The four remaining financial types are ranked from 1 peast independent) to 4(most
independent). Again the overall degree of financial independence is the sum of the asterislc.c in
columns 1-3. For instance, financial type 4(three asterisks) has budgetary autonomy, detecmines
of board members' salazies, and decides on profit allocation.
Table 3 provides a summary of the cross relationships between policy types and financial types.
Since there aze four policy types and four financial types, sizteen potential central bank types
result.
[INSERT TABLE 3A]
From this Table it can be seen that combinations (1,1); (1,3); (1,4); (2,1); (3,3); (3,4); (4,1);
(4,2) and (4,4) do not occur among the twelve industrial countries. Consequently, only eight
central bank (policy-financial) types ezist.
(iv) Relationships between central bank laws and monetary policy
BP now turn to an investigation of the relationship between central bank types and monetazy
policy. In their analysis of monetazy policy they focus on two aspects its inflationary stance pevel)
and the variability (variance) of inflation. The inflationary stance is measured by the average rate
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1 Au~tnlia








1 Govemmen approve~ budyet, deterntinea Bwrd Memben' ~larin ud profit ~Iloc~tion.
2 Bnnk delermines budyet ~Iloc~tion (and report~ lo Yovenunen); aovemment determiue~ Bwrd Memben'
~larie~ ud profit dlocation.
3 Bank detertninet budyet and Board Memben' alaries; profit allocation deterntined by qatute.
4 B~nk detenninu budYet, Board Memben' ulries ~nd profit ~llocation.
Folicv Tvou:
1 Governtnent i~ fio.l policy ~uthority, ha~ officul on bank Board, ud appoinu ~11 Boud Memben.
2 Like 1, but no govettuneet ofócial on banlc Board.
3 Bank i~ fin~l policy authority but ~ll Bwrd appointmenu nude by Yovetnmen.
4 Bank i~ final policy auUtority ud wme Bo~rd ~ppointmenu nude independently of yovemtnent.
Concerning policy variability, what is of interest is the variability of inflation as well as output
and employment. However, BP point out that if they were to measure variability of policy by
examining both nominal and real variability, inevitably conflicting rankings would result from
cross-country differences in slopes of short-run trade~ffs between output and inflation~o3)
Regarding these trade-offs well outside the scope of their study, they examine only the variability
of inflationlo4~.
First, BP examine the relationship between financial independence and the mentióned aspects of
monetary policy. After inspection of the relevant data they find that there is no association
whatsoever between the financial independence of its central bank from government and these two
103~ For an examination of aggregate detnand policy and exchange rate policy rulea in a multi-country
Phillips~urve fratnework ace Taylor (1982).
to4) Evw though interoat ratee aro the proximate inatrumenta of monetary policy, according to BP (p. 19)
there ia no inbereat inconaisteacy in uaing the variability of inflation ae tbe appropriate measttro of the
varisbitity of policy. Short-term interest rates are typically manipulated witb a view to achieving a
particular behaviour for the growtà rate of varioue moaetary aggregates, and theae aggregates are
further regarded as appropriate intermodiate targets in achieving predictable and leea variable inflation.
A diagnmmatic preaeatation of this line of reasoning ia given in Eijffmger, S. and Genrds, l. (1990),
p. 13.
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aspects of monetary policyt~.
Furthermore, con.cider Table 3B which permits a direct ezamination of the relationship between
policy independence and monetary policy.
Table 3B
Average Intlation and its Variability
Grouped Aocording to Central Banlc Policy Type:
F7exible Eirchar~ge Rate Period 1972-1986
tanatioa Rate Policy Varioóíl'dy
Ca~mtry Type Percet Radc
Staodard
De~iatio~ Raelc
Auunlu 1 9.9 (IO) 3.2 (n
BelBium 2 7.1 (6) 3.0 (S)
Canad~ 7.9 (1J 2.8 (3)
Fnnce 9.5 (9) 3.2 ('n
Iuly 14.0 (12) 4.6 (10)
Netóerland~ 5.8 (3) 3.0 (S)
Swedcn 8.9 (8) 2.5 (2)
United Kingdom I1.2 (l l) 6.0 (I1)
lapau 3 6.6 (4) 6.1 (12)
United Suw 6.9 (5) 3.5 (9)
Gerauny 4 4.3 (1) 2.0 (1)
Switurland 4.4 (2) 2.ê (J)
From Table 3B it appears that there is no association between any of the policy types and the
measure of variability of policy presented.
Moreover, consider the association between categories of central bank independence and the
inflation performance. From Table 2A it is clear that the first category (policy type 1) ditiers from
the second only in the presence of a governnment official on the bank boazd. According to BP it
is immediately appazent that there are no discernible differences in inflation rates between the first
two groups. The third and fourth groups (lapan, United States, Germany and Switzerland) aze the
independent central banlrs. BP think it striking that the two most independent central banks, those
of Germany and Switzerland, have delivered a lower inflation rate than the intermediate central
banks of Japan and the United States. Also, BP point out that the mean inflation rate of the eight
government dominated central banks (policy types 1 and 2) is in excess of ten percent; thus
although the U.S. and Japanese inflation rates aze well within two standazd deviations of that
mean, those of Switzerland and Germany are signficantly below the mean.
On the basis of these facts BP conclude that there is an association between the degree of central
bank policy independence and the average rate of inflation. By and large, the more independent
the central bank, the lower the inflation ratet~).
1~ Sce Bade and Parkin (1988), Table 4.
t~) This te,ntative conclusion is given formal conteot by estimating first order sutoregressions for inflation
(were all the coefficieats ~ lagged inflatioa were restricted to be equal) with inclusion of a dummy
variable for the Germwn and Swiss ceatral bank type, see Bade and Paricin (1988), p. 21-23.
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3.2 Alesina's Pbpularization
Strange enough the pioneering work of BP was not published. However, their work has been
integrated in the positive theory of economic policyl~ by Alesina (1988, 1989).
Alesina uses the BP indez of policy independence to illustrate the relationship between the degree
of politico-instititutional stability and economic performance. Alesina eztends BP's sample of
industrial countries to include New Zealand, Spain, Denmark, Norway and Finland, by using
institutional information provided by Masciandazo and Tabellini ( 1988) and Fair (1980),
respectively.
Alesina likewise concludes that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of independen-
ce of central banks and the average inflation rate (Alesina (1988), p. 41).1~) However, he
points out that this association does not necessazily imply a causal relation: "[I]t may suggest that
countries with a preference for low inflation prefer to set up independent central banks as the most
effective means of achieving this goal".1~)
Alesina's results can be summarized in Table 4.110)
Table 4
Inflation and Central Bank Independence (1973-198~
A~erase
leflatio~
A{eeio~ fader or Cmtral
Baolc
ledepmdmce
lirde Pr~icin Indac of Cea-
tral Baolc
Indepmdeace
tuiy t3.7 tn 2
[nc to.7 2 2
Auatnlia 9.7 1 1
Pnnce 9.2 2 2
Swedeo 8.7 2 2
Cwda 7.8 2 2
BelBium 6.9 2 2
US 6.9 3 3
7~pan 6.4 3 3
Netheda~da S.S 2 2
Switu~lend 4. l 4 4
Germany 4.1 4 4
As can be easily seen from this Table, the numerical values of the 'Alesina indez of central bank
independence' are identical to those of the BP index of policy independence, except for the case of
Italy.
Alesina has the following azgument for classifying Italy as ll2 rather than 2, as in BP:
1~ Alesina supports the rational pnrtisan theory, a theory that combines Hibbs' (1977) partisan theory with
rstional expectatione macroaconomic theory.
1~) This researoh was aleo published in the Report by the European Commission "One market, one
money". See Europe.an Commission (1990), pp. 97-98.
I~) Aleaina ( 1989), pp. 81-82.
1 t~ For ease of comparieon we focus on the BP eunple, sltipping New Zealand, Spain, Denmrrk, Norway
aod Finland.
Page 26
'Bade and Parkin's classifications disregard institutional changes in the period considered. The
Italian Central Bank obtained more economic independence in 1982 (...). Given this change we
classified Italy as ll2 rather than 2, as in Bade-Parkin."t t t)
Therefore, Alesina's argument contains two major elementc:
(1) The criticism of BP for their disregard of institutional changes
(2) The idendfication of institutional changes with changes in economic independeace.
The first element of Alesina's criticism has implications for the way of aggregating the attributes
which make up his indez. We will return to this issue later.
The second element is based on Tabellini's (1988) account of the divorce ('divorzio') between the
Treasury and the Italian Central Bank in 1981. After divorce the CICRt 12) no longer obliged
the Banca d'Italia to absorb all ezcess supply of short-term Treasury bills. This step decreased the
scope for accommodating monetary policy by monetary financing of government deficits and
increased the independence of Banca d'Italia.
In the preceding sub-section we saw that the BP index of policy independence is determined by
the total number of statutory attributes ('asterisks') concerning policy making and the appointment
of directors (BP (~ -~). If the Alesina indez is an eztension of the BP policy index, in the sense
that it is 'richer' and more informative, it must follow that:
(1) Alesina implicitly uses a fourth criterium say A4:
Is the central bartlc not required to absorb excess supply of short-term Treasury bills?
(2) The Alesina indicator of central bank independence is determined by a combination of
attributes (j - ~ and A4.
Having four BP policy types combined with criterion A4 yields 4z2 - 8 potential policy-
economic types. Conditional on internal consistency,113) the implied cross relationships
between the BP policy types and the Alesina economic types are summarized in Table 5.
I11) ~: ~~~ (1988), p. 42. However, Tabellini (1988), p. 96 states this change to have taken place in
the summer of 1981.
t t2) ~~CR (Comitato Interministeriale per il Cradito e il Risparmio), chaired by the Treasury , is the
ultimate suthority on monetary policy giving ditoctives for the Banca d'Italia.
113) We coosider the Alesina indez to be internally consisteat, if and only if in determining the indepe.aden-
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From this table it can be seen that, according to Alesina, only five central bank types can be
discerned among the twelve industrial countries.
These existing central bank types can be found in the bottom half of Table 6.
Table 6
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Again, there is no non-arbitrary way to aggregate attributes BP 1-~ and A4, i.e. to rank these
types from least independent to most independent. However, from Table 6 it can be easily seen
that Alesina did not follow BP in summing the amibutes possessed by the central bank. For if he
had, Banca d'Italia would have been qualified as type 3(upgrade) rather than type ll2 (downgra-
de) t ta)
Therefore, if the Alesina indez is internally consistent, it can be considered asymmetrical in the
t t4) ~~ ~~ ~~~ did not clarify the weighting procedure of Alesiaa ( 1988, 1989).
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sense that attributes are not weighted equally.
From Tables 5 and 6, reflecting the internal consistency assumption, it follows that:
(1) All central banks, except Banca d'Italia, are forced to accommodate fiscal policy with
monetary policy (Table ~
(2) Notwithstanding the fornmer the Banca d'Italia, being Alesina type 112, is less independent
Athan the central banks of France, Sweden, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. All of them are of the type 2 category (Table 6).
Since (1) and (2) are obviously counterfactual it follows that the Alesina (1988, 1989) synthetic
indicator of central bank independence is internally inconsistent (Reductio ad absurdum).
However, if the Alesina indez is internally inconsistent, i.e. it is not the case that in determining
the independence of each central bank all relevant criteria are used, the numerical values in table 4
cannot be compared and therefore do not qualify as 'indices' of central bank independence.
3.3 Towards Economic Independence: The Analysis ot Grilli, Masciandaro snd Tabellini
The most recent index of central bank independence is that of Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(1991) (GMT). They compare the monetary regimes of eighteen industrial countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States) during the post-war period (1950-1989) by focusing on political and economic independen-
ce of the central bank. Like BP and Alesina, they find that in countries with more independent
central banks inflation is on average lower and less variable. On the other hand, GMT find no
indication that the monetary regime matters for real economic performance.
Political independence
According to GMT, political independence is the capacity to choose the final goal of monetary
policy, such as inflation or the level of economic activity. The latter capacity is primarily
determined by the following features:
(i) Procedures for appointing the members of the central bank governing bodies (policy
boards)
(ii) Relationships between these governing bodies and the government
(iii) Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy.
On the basis of features (i) -(iii) GMT construct their index of political independence. The degree
of political independence is determined using eight criteria:tis)
t[5) To facilitate compuison correspooding BP criteria are givea in italics.
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~ Is the governor not appointed by the government?
~ Is the governor appointed for more than five years?
~ Are all boazd members not appointed by the government? (Compaze with BP ~: aze some
boazd appointments made independent of the government?)
4 Is the board appointed for more than five years7
~ Is there no mandatory participation of a govermnent representative in the boazd? (Compare
with BP ~: is there no government official on the bank boazd?)
~ Is there no government approval of monetary policy required? (Compare with BP ~: is the
bank the final policy authority?)
7 Are there statutory requirements that the bank pursues monetary stability among its goals?
,~ Are there legal provisions that strengthen the bank's position in case of conflicts with the
government?
The overall index of political independence is detecmined by a combination of the attributes ~-~.
Again, there is no non-arbitrary way of aggregating them. Like Bade and Pazkin, GMT choose the
simplest one: they simply summed the attributes possessed by the central bank. Thus, each
attribute is weighted equally. The eighteen central banks aze ranked from 1(least independent) to
6(most independent). GMT's results can be summazized in Table 7. t t6)
(SEE TABLE y]
From this table it can be seen that the GMT policy index is richer, i.e. more informative, than
the BP index of political independence. The GMT' is more informative because more criteria aze
taken into account. BP use only three criteria, whilst GMT consider eight attributes. It can be
easily seen that GM'T criteria ~ and ~ are identical to BP criteria ~ and j.. One is tempted to make
a similaz inference concerning GMT criterion ~. However, concerning the appointment of
directors GMT require all boazd members not to be appointed by the government, whilst BP
require only z l l l21 t t~ of board members not to be appointed by the government. Therefo-
re, GMT's criterion ~ is more strict than BP's criterion ~.
116) Again, for ~ae of comparison we focus on the BP sample, skipping Austria, Deamarlc, Greece,
Irelaad, New Zealaad, Portugal and Spain.











~ ~ ~ 4 ~ 6 7 ~ 9
AuMnl'u ' ' ' g
BelQium ' 1
Goada ' ' . ' 4
Fnnce ' ' 2
(3erovny ' . ' . ' ' 6
~y . . . . 4
Japan ' 1
Netherlands ' ' ' . . ' 6
Swib~riaod ' ' . . ' S
U.K. ' 1
U.S. ' ' ' ' ' S
Sweden - - - - - - - -
Now:
1~ Govemor ~o appoided by Yovernment
2 a Govenwr appoiMed for ~ S yun
3~ 1~11 the Bwtd not appointed by yovenunem
4- Bwrd appointed for ~ S yun
S- No m~tdatory participation of Yovemment rcprcaenlative in the Board
6- No yovemment approval of monelary policy fornwlation i~ requiied
7 s Statubry rcquinmenta that central bank punuu monetary pability amony ila eosls
S~ I.eeal proviaiom that Rnnyhtened the cemral bank pwition in conflicu with the Yovetnnrcnt arc prc~ent
9- Ovenll index of pditical iodepeodeoce, conswcled as ~he am of the aweri~lu in ach row
In order to compaze GMT's fmdings with these of BP, we restrict attention to attributes ~, ~, and
~ of GMT. Since aggregation procedures aze identical, differences in numerical values of the BP
and GMT indices aze dependent on:
(a) differerences in the interpretation of the central bank laws with respect to GMT-amibutes ~
and ~ (or BP attributes ~ and ~
(b) the difference between GMT attribute ~ and BP attribbute ~.
We label differences (a) and (b) respectively interpretation effect and criterion effect. Thus
numerical differences depend on both these effects. The total effect is decomposed in Table 8.
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Table 8










(See ~ate bdow) W (d) k) (d) (e)
Auwnlu 1 1
Belyium 1 2 -1 -1
Caa.da 1 2 -1 -1
Pnace 1 2 -1 -1
Germany 3 4 -1 -1
IWy 3 2 tl tl
lapan 1 3 -2 -2
Nuherlands 3 2 t l t 1









(Number of eateridu in colum~u 3, 5~nd 6 of T~ble ~ t 1.
Su Tabk 3A
(Number of aperirks in columtu S~ ud 6 of T~ble 7 t wmber of ~weridu in column ~1 of Table 2A) t 1- BP Policy
Type.
(Number of ~peridu in columm 1~nd 2 of Table 2A t number of ~Werislu in column 3 of T~ble n t 1- BP Policy
rya.
(c) t(d) z toul diffe~ence between GMT and BP.
With respect to the interpretation effect, from Table 8 it can be seen that GMT and BP differ in
their interpretations of the central bank laws of Canada, France, Belgium, Japan, and the Nether-
lands.
Canada, France, and Belgium aze downgraded (-1), because contrary to BP GMT believe a
government representative to be present on the central bank boazds. The Nederlandsche Bank is
upgraded (t 1), because unlike BP, GMT consider the central bank to be the final authority in
policy making. The differences aze most striking in the case of Japan. The Bank of Japan is
severely downgraded (-2), because GMT believe that the government has an official on the bazilc
boazd, while according to BP there is no official. GMT are also of the opinion that the govern-
ment is the final suthority in policy making, contradiMing BP. We will return to these differences
in section 4.
With respect to the criterion effect, by using a stricter version of BP ~, GMT change the ranking
of the Bundesbank, Banca d'Italia and the Swiss National Bank vis à vis BP. Both the Bundesbank
and the Swiss National Bank aze downgraded (-1), whilst Banca d'Italia is upgraded (t 1). It
should be noticed that because the BP type 4 banks (Germany and Switzerland) do not meet GMT
criterion ~, they become intermediate banks. That is, in terms of political independence, they get
the same status as the Federal Reserve (BP type 3). This is intuitively not very appealing. Neither
is the fact that Banca d'Italia is the only central bank that meets GMT criterion ~. Therefore, we
conclude that by introducing a very strict criterion concerning the appointment of direitors, GMT
severely bias the ranking of the central banks of Germany, Switzerland and Italy.
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Economic Independence
According to GMT, economic independence is the capacity to choose the instruments of monetary
policy. To describe the sutonomy of a central bank in choosing the instruments of monetary
policy, GMT focus on two features:
(i) The influence of the government in determining how much to borrow from the central bank
(ii) T6e nature of the monetary instruments under the control of the central bank.
With regard to the first aspect, GMT remark that if the government can influence the quantity and
the conditions at which it borrows from the cetttral bank, it also influences the aeation of the
monetary base. Hence, the greater the government influence on the monetary financing of the
budget deficit, the smaller is the economic independence of the central bank.
Concerning monetary financing, the degree of economic independence is determined using four
criteria:
j, Is the direct credit facility of the government non-automatic?
~ Is it at market interest rates?
~ Is it ezplicitly temporary?
4 Is it of limited amount?
With regard to the second aspect (monetary instruments) GMT focus on two questions. First, does
the central bank have control over the discount rate? GMT state that a negative answer implies
that the monetary authorities are severely impaired in determining the general level of interest
rates.lls) ~e second question is whether monetary control can also rely on administrative
instruments (such as portfolio constraints on bank intermediaries or ceilings to private bank
lending), or not. According to GMT a positive answer suggests that monetary policy can be
constrained, at least indirectly, by the goal of facilitating the financing of government borrowing.
The reason is that these administrative instruments, generally, increase the private demand for
government securities, whereas indirect methods of monetary control operate mainly through
adjustment in interest rates. Therefore, discretion over the use of an administrative instrument can
weaken the economic independence of the central bank.
Concerning monetary in.ctruments the degree of economic independence is determined using three
criteria:
118) Note that the 'general level of interest rates' also depends on non interest-rate instruments like mooey-
market operatioos ~d reserve requireme,nt ratio's. For a survey of instruments aod opentting
procedures in France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., see Batteo, Blaclcwell,
Kim, Nocera and Ozeki (1990).
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~ Does the central bank not participate in the primary market for government debt?
~ Is the discount rate set by the central banlc?
7 Is banking supervision not entrusted to the central bank or not entrusted to the central bank
alone?
C~n the basis of feature (i) the influence of government in determining how much to borrow from
the central bank (criteria 1- 4) and feature (ii) the nature of the monetary instruments under the
control of the central bank (criteria ~-,, GMT construct their indez of ewnomic independence.
Tfius, the overall degree of economic independence is determined by a combination of aaributes
~- 7. The eighteen central banks aze ranked from 1(least independent) to 7(most independent).
GMT's results can be summarized in Table 9.119)
Table 9








j, ~ ~ 4 ~ 6 7 ~
AuMnlia ~ ' ' ' ~ ~ 6
Bel~ium ' ' ' ' ' ' 6
Cao~da . . . ~ . . . 7
Ftutce . ~ ~ . . i
cleetm.ny . . . . . . . ~
iwy ~ 1
Japao ' ' ' ' ' S
Netherland~ ~ . ~ . {
Swiaedand ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7
U.K. ' ' ' ' ' S
U.S. . . . . . . . ~
Sweden - - - - - - - -
Note~:
1 ~ Direcl ctedit 6ciGty: mt euWmatic
2 ~ Dieat crcdit ficility: martd itNerc~t n[e
3 a INtect cndit C~cility: temponry
{ ~ Dircct uedit ficility: limited ~mouM
3~ Ceatnl budc doee not puticipate in primuy m~rket fw public debt
6~ Diecounl nte ~et by centn! bank
7~ Beokin~ wtpetvirioo gQ~ e~u~ted to táe cemnl badc (~ ') or not enruwad b ihe ceatnl benk elone (h
t s Ovenll inde: of ecooomie independence (beinQ tbe wtm of tbe arteri~ts ia columne 1-~
119) ~ footnote 19.
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As we emphasized earlier, there is no non-arbitrary way of aggregating attributes ~- Z. However,
from the notes in table 9 it follows that GMT did ~ weigh each aaribute equally. This becomes
immediately clear if look at criterion 7. If banking supervision is not entrusted to the central bank
it gets two asterisks. If it is not exclusively entrusted to the central bank it gets one asterisk.
Finally, if banking supervision is exclusively entrusted to the central baztk it gets zero asterisks.
Therefore, regarding criterion 7 the maximttm amount of asterisks is higher (two) than that with
respect to criteria 1-~(one). This means that criterion 1 óas a weight of 218, two times the
weight of the other criteria (ll8). Hence, the GMT index of economic independence is asymmetri-
cal in the sense that attributes aze not weighted equally. The motive for such an asymmetrical
weighting in favour of banking supervision is not evident.
4 TOWARDS A NEW INDEX OF POLICY INDEPENDENCE
4.1 A new index of political independence
Following GMT, we identify policy independence with the capacity of the central banks to choose
the final goals of monetazy policy. This capacity is primarily determined by the following
features:
(i) Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy
(ii) The relationship between central banks and government in the formulation of monetary policy
(iii) The procedures for appointing the boazd of the central bank.
On the basis of features (i) -(iii) we construct our own index, which is called the Eijffinger-
Schaling (ES) index of policy independence. The degree of policy independence is determined
using three criteria:
~ Is the bank the sole final policy authocity (b), is this authority not entrusted to the central
bank alone (b~g), or is it entrusted completely to the government (g)?
~ Is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the bank boazd?
~ Are more than half of the boazd appointments made independent of the government?1201
Now we can distinguish 3 x 2 z 2- 12 potential policy types. This is summarized in Table 10.
[INSERT TABLE 10]
The first four types are the BP potential types (a)-(d). In section 3 it was shown that these types
do not ezist. For sake of convenience we repeat the azgument. A central bank being itself in
charge of monetary policy and also having a government official on its board (types (c) and (d))
does not occur in reality. Besides, there is no central bank that in spite of its not being in chazge
~~ Following BP tèia criterion is operationalized as: proportion of inembers pot appointed directly or
indirectly by the governm~t 2 11121.
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of monetary policy, makes some boazd appointments independent of the government. Therefore,
types (a) and (b) do not exist.
Table 10





















- W - ` (~) m -
- c~ . ~ ro) m -
.. ro) - . c~) ~ -
.. ro) - - ca~ ~ -
~ ro~~ - - ce) ~ -
. ro,~ . ~ c~ m -
' ro's) - ' ca) ~ -
- (~ - - ro) y~. ~
- c~ ~ - c) y~. z
' ro~~ ' - G) y~. s
.. ro) . - m y~, a
.. ro) . . m y~. s
From our examination of central bank laws in section 2, it follows that this azgument includes the
'twin-authority' central banks, i.e. the central banks which have some but incomplete policy
authority (blg). That is, a'twin-authority' central banlc that has a government official on its boazd
(type e) does not exist. Finally, there is no twin-authority bank that makes some boazd appoint-
ments independent of the government. Consequently potential types (f) and (g) do not exist either.
So, only the bottom part of Table 10 is relevant for the ES index of policy independence. The
overall degree of policy independence is determined by a combination of amibutes ES j~ -~.
Contrary to BP and GMT, we do not weigh each attribute equally. This becomes cleaz if we take
a look at ES j.. If policy making is exclusively entrusted to the central bank a country gets two
asterisks. If it is not exclusively entrusted to the central it gets one asterisk. Finally, if the
government is the sole authority in policy making it gets zero asterisks. Therefore, regazding our
first criterion the maximum amount of asterisks is higher (two) than that with respect to criteria
ES ~ and ~(one). This means that criterion ~ has a weight of 214, two times the weight of the
other criteria (ll4). Hence, our index is asymmetrical in the sense that attributes are not weighted
equally. We will return to this issue later. Thus, the five remaining (existing) central bank types
aze ranked from 1(least independent) to 5(most independent) according to the number of
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asterisks.
Our findings are summarized in Table 11. In order to facilitate comparison with the literature we
include BP's results.
Tabk 11
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Again, differences in numerical values are dependent on both interpretation- and criterion effects.
In order to isolate the criterion effect we construct 'BP Asymmetrical Policy Types' (BPA). The
latter types result when BP outcomes are entered into our (asymmetrical) aggregation procedure.
For instance, consider Japan. According to BP the bank is the final policy authority. In terms of
our aggregation procedure this means two asterisks, rather than one. Therefore as a consequence
of the higher relative weight attachefl to this criterion the Bank of Japan becomes BP (asymmeui-
cal) type 4.
Now the total difference between ES and BP can be decomposed according to the following
formulaï
ES - BP -(ES - BPA) f(BPA - BP)
Where the first term on the right hand side is the interpretation effect and the second term is the
criterion effect. From Table 11 it follows that the interpretation effects (see column (d)) concern
Belgium, Canada, Japan, The Netherlands and the United States.
The National Bank of Belgium is upgraded (f 1), because we regard it a twin-authority (blg)
rather than a government dominated institution (g). This is because the bank gained more
independence by the reform of the money market and monetary instruments in January 1991 (see
section 1). The Bank of Canada is downgraded (-1) because, contrary to BP, we find a govern-
ment official on the board, namely the Deputy Minister of Finance (without voting power).
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The Bank of Japan is downgraded (-1) because unlike BP we consider it to be a twin-authority
(blg) rather than a bank dominated (b) iastitution. The Nederlandsche Bank is upgraded (i-2),
because we consider it independent in policy making (b) rather than dependent (g) as a consequen-
ce of the only formal right of the Minister of Finance to give directions to the Bank. Finally, the
Federal Reserve System is downgraded because unlike BP (b), we consider it a twin-authority
iastitution (blg).
In Table 12 our findings aze confronted with GMT's.
Table 12
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Also, the total difference between ES and GMT may be decomposed, taking the following
formula:
ES - GMT -(ES - BP) f(BP - GMT)
Where the first term on the right hand side is decomposed in Table 12 and the second term is
decomposed in Table 8.
4.2 Evaluation
Our main findings regazding the ezisting indices can be summazized as follows. Alesina (1988,
1989) made some serious mistakes in updating Bade and Pazkin (1988). Hence, the Alesina
revision of the position of the Banca d'Italia implies counterfactual statements concerning e.g
monetary accommodation of government deficits. Therefore, the Alesina revision is ad hoc and his
indez inconsistent.
Furthermore, GMT and BP differ in their interpretations of the central bank laws of Canada,
France, Belgium, Japan, and the Netherlands. These differences refer to both the presence of
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government officials on the bank board, and the final authority in policy making. Also, by using
a very strict criterion with respect to the appointment of directors GMT severely bias the ranking
of the Bundesbank, Banca d'Italia and the Swiss National Bank vis à vis that by Bade and Pazkin.
It is important to notice that the GMT index of policy independence is based on the features:
(i) Formal responsibilities (policy goals) of the central bank with respect to rttonetary policy
(ii) The relationship between central banlcs and government in the formulation of monetary policy
(iii)The procedures for appointing the boazd of the central bank.
However, GMT separately assess features (i) and (ii). For ezample, the following conclusions can
be drawn considering the Reserve Bank of Australia. From Table 7 it follows that according to
GMT the Reserve Bank Act of 1959 contains provisions that the central bank pursues monetary
stability (GMT ~ among its goals. On the other hand, according to Table 7, the government is
the final policy authority (GMT ~. Therefore, GMT assess the contents of the final goals of
monetary policy (GMT ~ irrespective of the capacity to choose these goals (GMT ~J. By their
separate assessment GMT allow for a one for one trade-0ff between the capacity to pursue a
monetary policy goal and the contents of such a goal. That is, restricting attention to GMT ~ and
7, a subservient central bank with provisions for monetary stability is as independent as a
autonomous central bank without these provisions. Of course, this trade-off is a natural conse-
quence of symmetrical weighting.
Like GMT, the ES indea of policy independence is based on features (i) -(ii). However, we want
to avoid the mentioned trade-off phenomenon. Therefore feature ( i) the final authority in policy
making is assessed in conjunction with feature (ii) the policy goals of monetary policy. That is,
the eztent to which a central bank is regarded to be the sole policy authority ( ES 1), also depends
on the presence of statutory requirements concerning monetazy stability. Hence, we think a double
weigth (2l4 vs ll4) with respect to the first criterion seems to be justified. The main chazacteristic
of an independent central bank is, of course, its duty and ability to conduct an autonomous
monetary policy directed at price stability.
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